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CRIMINAL LA.w-EvroENCE-SILENCE TO AccusATION WHILE UNDER ARREsT

GUILT-Defendant was convicted of murder. Before the victim
died, defendant, handcuffed and in custody of police, had been taken to the hospital room where the victim lay. Eight witnesses were present at the time, and
each testified that the victim pointed out the defendant as her assailant. At the
trial the witnesses were permitted to testify that when accused of the crime, defendant stood by silently, saying and doing nothing, although it also appeared that
he had been told by the police chief to ''keep your mouth shut." The prosecution
capitalized upon defendant's silence as an admission of guilt. On appeal, held,
reversed. Defendant, while under arrest, had no duty to speak or to deny the
As ADMISSION OF
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accusation, and his silence could not be construed as an admission. People v.
Mleczko, 298 N.Y. 153, 81 N.E. (2d) 65 (1948).
By the great weight of authority, inculpatory statements made in the presence
of an accused and not denied by him are admissible against him as evide:qce of his
acquiescence to the truth of the statement, as an exception to the hearsay rule, on
the theory that it is contrary to ~e experiences of men to allow such statements
to go unchallenged unless true.1 Admitting the force of this rule, courts are very
careful to restrict its application, because such evidence is not of great probative
force. The statement must be made in the presence and hearing of the accused; 2 it
must affect his rights; 3 it must be understood by him4 and call for a reply.5 Also, the
accused must have an opportunity to speak freely. 6 Especially wide is the divergence of judicial opinion as to whether the accused remains "free" to speak when
under arrest at the time the statement is made. Some courts say that the fact of
arrest alone affects the weight rather than the competency of the evidence, and is
merely one of the circumstances to be considered in determining whether the
accused was free to speak.7 Other courts, as in the principal case, hold that arrest
places the accused under such restraint that he cannot be called upon to speak.8
The foundation for this view comes from an early Massachusetts decision9 which
has been so enlarged upon that it renders the accused's silence when accused while
under arrest inadmissible in all cases.10 Although New York now seems committed to the Massachusetts rule, much authority can be found for the other view in
that state.1 1 One could scarcely deny that the present defendant was under restraint; under such circumstance, it would seem that virtually all courts would
hold the evidence inadmissible, or of little weight. However, the desirability of
the broad rule of the instant case is questionable. That arrest may place such
2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EvmENCE, §656 (1935); 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, §734.
Myers v. State, 192 Ind. 592, 137 N.E. 547 (1922).
3 McNutt v. State, 163 Ark. 444, 260 S.W. 393 (1924).
4 People v. Lewis, 238 N.Y. 1, 143 N.E. 771 (1924).
5 Bob v. State, 32 Ala. 560 (1858).
6 "A party's acquiescence, to have t:}le effect of an admission, must exhibit some act of
voluntary demeanor or conduct." People v. Koerner, 154 N.Y. 355 at 374, 48 N.E. 730
(1897).
7 Skidmore v. State, 59 Nev. 320, 92 P. (2d) 79 (1939); 80 A.LR. 1259 (1932); 22
C.J.S., Criminal Law, §734 at 1264.
s State v. Redwine, 23 Wash. (2d) 467, 161 P. (2d) 205 (1945); 80 A.LR. 1262
(1932); 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, §734 at 1263.
9 Commonwealth v. Kenny, 53 Mass. 235, 46 Am. Dec. 672 (1847).
10 Courts holding otherwise insist that later Massachusetts cases have misconstrued the
Kenny case, as other circumstances besides arrest were present to prevent a reply by the
accused. See 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, §661 at p. 1103 (1935) and cases cited
therein.
11 "It is no objection to the admission of the declarations of the accused, as evidence, that
they are made while he is under arrest, and his admission, either express or implied, of the
truth of a statement made by others under the same circumstances is equally admissible,"
Kelley v. People, 55 N.Y. 565 at '572, 14 Am. Rep•.342 (1874); followed in People v. Cascia,
191 App. Div. (N.Y.) 376, 181 N.Y.S. 855 (1920); disapproved in People v. Rutigliano,
261 N.Y. 103, 184 N.E. 689 (1933).
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restraint on the accused as to deny him the opportunity to speak freely should not
be denied by any court; that fear, 12 pain, 13 advice of counsel,14 admonition,15
and other circumstances may likewise restrain the accused is also recognized. Yet
under the latter circumstances each case has been made to depend upon its own
facts. It is submitted that each case of arrest should also be decided upon its own
facts. The rule that arrest automatically excludes evidence of accused's acquiescence to an accusation robs the law of flexibility without any appreciable gain to
the accused. If the maxim qui tacet consentire videtur has validity, there is little
logic in the rule of the principal case, which is, in effect, that arrest will always
restrain the accused from speaking freely. Under the experiences of the past such
a view is scarcely justified.16
Colvin A. Peterson, Jr.

12 Merriweatherv.

Commonwealth, 118 Ky. 870, 82 S.W. 592 (1904).
756 (1914).
N.E. 943 (1911); People v. Blumenfeld, 330
Ill. 474, 161 N.E. 857 (1928).
15 People v. Kessler, 13 Utah 69, 44 P. 97 (1896).
16 For example, see Murphy v. State, 36 Ohio St. 628 (1881) (one defendant volunteered information in the presence of an officer against a co-defendant also present). See also
Commonwealth v. Merrick, 255 Mass. 510, 152 N.E. 377 (1926); and cases annotated in 22
C.J.S., Criminal Law, §732 at 1253.
13 Cook-v. People, 56 Colo. 477, 138 P.
14 People v. Conrow, 200 N.Y. 356, 93

